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A Modern Approach to the Legal Malpractice Tort
A plaintiff faces serious obstacles to recovery in a legal malpractice
action because the tort law requirement' that he accept the burden of proof
on the issues of cause-in-fact and negligence is, in many instances, applied
in such a way as to insulate the attorney from liability. As a result of the
persistent application of legal principles long abandoned in other areas of
tort law, the legal malpractice plaintiff often loses even before he is heard
on the merits of his action.2 For example, although the discovery rule3 has
been applied by most jurisdictions in malpractice actions against other
professionals to prevent the harsh application of the traditional rule that
the statute of limitations runs from the time the wrong is committed, the
plaintiff in a legal malpractice action is rarely permitted to take advantage
of it.4 Moreover, despite the fact that "[i]n every jurisdiction the courts
'Legal malpractice actions have sounded both in contract and negligence. See, e.g.,
Neel v. Magana, 6 Cal. 3d 176, 491 P.2d 421, 98 Cal. Rptr. 837 (1971); Grago v. Robertson, 49
App. Div. 2d 645, 370 N.Y.S.2d 255 (Sup. Ct. 1975); Peters v. Summons, - Wash. 2d
552 P.2d 1053 (1976). The cause of action, however, for all practical purposes is in tort since:
"[I]f the action is treated as one ex contractu courts . ..declare the attorney 'impliedly
contracts' to exercise the degree of care, skill and knowledge which is required by the
negligence standard." Wade, The Attorney's Liability for Negligence, 12 VAND. L. REV. 755,
756-57 (1959). To recover the plaintiff must prove 1) a duty owed by the attorney to the client,
2) a breach of that duty and 3) injury to the client which is proximately caused by the
attorney's breach. For various statements of the elements required to make out a prima facie
case of legal malpractice, see, e.g., Eckert v. Schaal, 251 Cal. App. 2d 1, 58 Cal. Rptr. 817
(1967); Hansen v. Wightman, 14 Wash. App. 78, 538 P.2d 1238 (1975); Modica v. Crist, 129
Cal. App. 2d 144, 276 P.2d 614 (1954). Cause-in-fact is not explicitly stated as an element of
the plaintiff's prima facie case; still, it is generally accepted that "[iun order to recover in a
negligence action against an attorney it is necessary to show tht his negligence was the cause
of legal damage to the client." Wade, The Attorney's Liability for Negligence, 12 VAND. L.
REV. 755, 769 (1959).
2See Wallach & Kelly, Attorney Malpractice in California: A Shaky Citadel, 10 SANTA
CLARA LAw. 257 (1970) where the authors recognize:
The lawyer who commits a malpractice in the representation of his clients ... is
protected by a maze of ancient legal principles which make it virtually impossible
for the injured client to be made whole or even for the lawyer to be reprimanded.
Id. at 257.
3The discovery rule is a judicial creation which tolls the statute of limitations until the
plaintiff discovers or should have discovered the harm.4The general rule is that a cause of action in legal malpractice accrues and the statute
begins to run when the attorney commits the negligent act, regardless of whether the
malpractice victim knew or could have known about the negligence. See, e.g., Lally v. Kuster,
177 Cal. 783, 171 P. 961 (1918); Galloway v. Hood, 69 Ohio App. 278, 43 N.E.2d 631 (1941);
Deneer v. Rouse, 48 Wis. 2d 528, 180 N.W.2d 521 (1970). The general rule is criticized in Note,
The Commencement of the Statute of Limitations in Legal Malpractice Actions - The Need
for Reevaluation, 15 U.C.L.A. L. REv. 230 (1967). That the policy reasons for the application of
the discovery rule apply in legal as well as other types of professional malpractice actions has
been recognized by some courts. See, e.g., Neel v. Magana, 6 Cal. 3d 176, 188, 491 P.2d 421,
428, 98 Cal. Rptr. 837, 844 (1971):
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have recognized that the concept of privity is an anomaly in tort
litigation," 5 third parties are seldom allowed to maintain an action against an
attorney. 6  The judicial refusal to apply the discovery rule and the
continued application of the privity doctrine in legal malpractice not only
represent inconsistencies in the law of malpractice, but also have the effect
of dismissing many valid suits against negligent attorneys at the trial court
level.' These considerations indicate that an expansion of the theories of
legal malpractice liability on the appellate level is both justified and
necessary.
The modifications to the present approach to legal malpractice
proposed herein are consistent with tort concepts such as the doctrines of
causation and negligence and yet promote several desirable social policies.
First, in easing the burden of recovery for legal malpractice plaintiffs the
risk of loss will be shifted to the party best able to insure against it.8 Many
legal practitioners point to the disastrous rise in medical malpractice
insurance premiums which has resulted from the judicial expansion of
liability in that area; they argue that a similar result would obtain in the
Corollary to [the attorney's] expertise is the inability of the layman to detect
its misapplication; the client may not recognize the negligence of the professional
when he sees it. He cannot be expected to know the relative medical merits of
alternative anesthetics nor the various legal exceptions to the hearsay rule. If he
must ascertain malpractice at the moment of its incidence, the client must hire a
second professional to observe the work of the first, an expensive and impractical
duplication, clearly destructive of the confidential relationship between the practi-
tioner and his client.
Id. at 188, 491 P.2d at 428, 98 Cal. Rptr. at 844.
5Haughey, Lawyers' Malpractice: A Comparative Appraisal, 48 NOTRE DAME LAW. 888,
894 (1973) [hereinafter cited as Lawyers' Malpractice].
6The general rule states that an attorney is not liable to third persons for his negligent
acts. See, e.g., Savings Bank v. Ward, 100 U.S. 195 (1879); McDonald v. Stewart, 289 Minn. 35,
182 N.W.2d 437 (1970); Waugh v. Dibbens, 61 Okla. 221, 160 P. 589 (1916). Many view the
continued application of the privity doctrine in the area of legal malpractice as\another
scheme used by the profession to artifically insulate its members from liability. gee, e.g., Note,
Attorney Malpractice, 63 COLUM. L. REV. 1292, 1312 (1963). The privity doctrine is especially
anamalous in the legal malpractice actions involving defectively drawn wills or defective title
searches, since in these cases the attorney's activity is clearly intepded to affect the third party.
Within this class of cases, some courts have extended the third party beneficiary theory of
contracts to the field of legal malpractice. See AverilI, Attorney's Liability to Third Persons
for Negligent Malpractice, 2 LAND & WATER L. REV. 379, 400 (1967); Note, Attorney
Malpractice, 63 COLUM. L. REV. 1292, 1310 (1963). The privity rule has been eliminated in
California see, e.g., Heyer v. Flaig, 70 Cal. 2d 223, 449 P.2d 161, 74 Cal. Rptr. 225 (1969);
Lucas v. Hamm, 56 Cal. 2d 583, 364 P.2d 685, 15 Cal. Rptr. 821, cert. denied, 368 U.S. 987
(1961); Donald v. Garry, 19 Cal. App. 3d 769, 97 Cal. Rptr. 191 (1971), but in the majority of
jurisdictions, the general rule of privity is strictly applied.7See, e.g., Mickel v. Murphy, 147 Cal. App. 2d 718, 305 P.2d 993 (1957) (defendant-
attorney's demurrer based on lack of privity affirmed); Gilbert Properties, Inc. v. Millstein, 33
N.Y.2d 857, 307 N.E.2d 257 (1973); Fladerer v. Needleman, 30 App. Div. 2d 371, 292 N.Y.S.2d
277 (1968) (dismissal based on statute of limitations affirmed).
8Legal malpractice insurance is widely available, and most practitioners are covered. See
generally Denenberg, Ehre & Huling, Lawyers' Professional Liability Insurance: The Peril,
the Protection and the Price, 1970 INs. L.J. 389; LeHouillier, Legal Malpractice: The Risks
and Insurance Protection, 42 INs. COUNSEL J. 106 (1975).
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field of legal malpractice if liability is expanded. This is not a valid
objection, however, since the enormous rise in medical malpractice
insurance costs can be directly traced to the high cost of medical care and
the concomitant recoveries resulting from a doctor's malpractice;9 actions
in legal malpractice rarely result in such huge judgments. Second, the
present approach to legal malpractice artifically insulates the negligent
attorney from liability, which is obnoxious to the generally recognized
policy of deterring negligent conduct; an increase in the legal malpractice
recovery rate would result in a higher quality of advocacy because attorneys
who are consistently careless in meeting deadlines and filing papers would
consistently be held liable and subject to professional reprimand.
The purpose of this note is to propose solutions to the problems
encountered by the legal malpractice plaintiff by reducing to a tolerable
level the burden which the plaintiff must bear in order to recover; these
solutions will promote the aforementioned policies and will bring about
more equitable results.
THREE BASIC CATEGORIES OF LEGAL MALPRACTICE:
THE CURRENT TREATMENT
Regardless of the type of legal malpractice of which the client is a
victim, the difficulty of recovery is aggravated by a judicial approach to
legal malpractice which both disregards policy and is unsupported by the
history of negligence actions against professionals. A legal malpractice
action may be characterized, depending on the surrounding factual
situation, as falling into one of three categories, 10 each of which receives
different treatment by the courts. The first category, which might be
termed "litigation malpractice," involves an error made by the attorney in
the litigation of his client's action." The second category comprises
situations in which the attorney has failed to discover the applicable law,
resulting in the loss of his client's action. Finally, the third category of
legal malpractice actions involves cases in which the attorney has exercised
his informed professional judgment and yet was proven incorrect.
Litigation Malpractice: The Suit Within a Suit Rule
Litigation malpractice, easily distinguishable within the broad field of
legal malpractice, consists of any error committed by the attorney as a
91t should also be noted that the award of punitive damages in legal malpractice actions
is rare. See, e.g., Welder v. Mercer, 247 Ark. 999, 448 S.W.2d 952 (1970) (award of punitive
damages in legal malpractice action requires more than a showing of gross negligence).
'
0That legal malpractice actions may be categorized depending on the factual char-
acteristics has been recognized by other writers on the subject. See, e.g., Lawyers' Malpractice,
supra note 5.
"Litigation malpractice is a part of the more general area involving inadvertant errors
made by the attorney; this category is discussed by Haughey, in Lawyers' Malpractice, supra
note 5, at 892-94.
1977]
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result of which the client either loses entirely his opportunity to litigate the
merits of his case or does not receive the benefit of a full and fair trial on all
the issues. The most common example of this type of malpractice is the
inadvertent failure of the attorney to file his client's action within the
statute of limitations.1 2 Other examples are: failue to perfect an appeal,
faulty service of summons, failure to comply with venue or jurisdiction
requirements and failure to plead or argue a valid claim or defense.'" When
an action in legal malpractice falls within this category, the plaintiff will
usually have little difficulty proving that his attorney was negligent
because most actions of this type involve the failure on the part of the
attorney to comply with technical rules well known by a legal practi-
tioners. In a litigation malpractice action, however, the plaintiff, in order
to prevail on the issue of cause-in-fact, must prove more than that his
original action was lost or compromised. When the attorney causes his
client to lose his cause of action or be denied a full trial on the merits, "the
rule has developed that ... the client.., must show not only that the attorney
was negligent but also that the result would have been different except for
his negligence."' 4 Since it requires the plaintiff-client to prove two cases in
a single proceeding, this rule has been termed the "suit within a suit"
requirement. 15 Thus, when the attorney's negligent act involves some
aspect of the litigation in the underlying action, the malpractice plaintiff
must prove his action against the opposing party in the underlying action
as well as his action against the attorney.' 6 Further, the malpractice
plaintiff must also prove the ability of the original opposing party to
respond in damages, 7 so that the insolvency of the original opposing party
12See, e.g., Walker v. Porter, 44 Cal. App. 3d 174, 118 Cal. Rptr. 468 (1974); Baker v. Beal,
225 N.W.2d 106 (Iowa 1975).
1SSee, e.g., Better Homes, Inc. v. Rodgers, 195 F. Supp. 93 (N.D. W. Va. 1961) (failure to
perfect appeal); Harding v. Bell, 265 Or. 202, 508 P.2d 216 (1973) (failure to assert a valid
defense). The plaintiff in a legal malpractice action might have been either the plaintiff or the
defendant in the underlying action.
'
4Wade, The Attorney's Liability for Negligence, 12 VAND. L. REv. 755, 769 (1959). This
rule is not followed in the rare case in which the result of the original action is beyond
dispute. The recent case of Watkins v. Sheppard, 278 So. 2d 890 (La. Ct. App. 1973), is
illustrative. In that case, one Netterville negligently drove his car into Watkin's car, which
was parked in the latter's driveway. The defendant-attorney failed to file Watkin's action
within the one-year prescription period. The court did not bother to discuss the causation
issue: "The existence of an attorney-client relationship between Sheppard and Watkins is not
an issue in the suit, nor is the probable success of Watkins' action for property damages for the
negligence of Netterville." 278 So. 2d at 891.
15See Coggin, Attorney Negligence. . . A Suit Within a Suit, 60 W. VA. L. REv. 225
(1958) [hereinafter cited as Attorney Negligence].
16For example, if the attorney fails to file the client's complaint in a personal injury
action within the statutory period, the plaintiff-client must prove the negligence of the
original defendant and of the defendant-attorney; the attorney can use the original defendant's
defense of contributory negligence as an affirmative defense to the malpractice action. See
Maryland as. Co. v. Price, 231 F. 397 (4th Cir. 1916); Piper v. Green, 216 Ill. App. 590 (1920).
170f course, if the plaintiff-client in the malpractice action was the defendant in the
original action, he will not have to prove the original plaintiff's ability to respond in damages
unless a cross complaint was involved.
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is an additional defense for the attorney; the defendant-attorney in fact has
at his disposal all of the original opposing party's defenses.' 8
It is virtually undisputed that the burden of proving two actions in a
single proceeding is extremely heavy. At least one commentator suggests
that this burden is the plaintiff-client's most difficult task,' 9 and even those
who support the suit within a suit requirement concede its harshness:20
The cases are not at all clear as to the extent of the burden which the
client must assume, that is, whether he need only prove that he would have
been successful in the original action by evidence sufficient to convince the
jury in the malpractice action that the jury or court in the original
proceeding would have found for him in the absence of the attorney's
negligence, or whether he must establish, to the satisfaction of the court in
the malpractice action and as a matter of law that he clearly or probably
would have won the original action. In either case the burden is an
extremely difficult one, as is demonstrated by the number of cases in which
the client has failed on this point. 2'
The rationale behind the imposition of the suit within a suit
requirement in litigation malpractice actions is easily stated: the loss of an
invalid action or a worthless judgment causes no damage at all. This
rationale, thought persuasive on its face, has two conceptual difficulties.
First, the suit within a suit requirement extends the burden 'of proof
normally required in a tort action. The requirement that the plaintiff
prove cause-in-fact in a negligence action is universally accepted and
reflects the doctrine of fault which underlies American tort law.2 2 The
major policy behind this requirement is that frivolous suits against
innocent defendants should be summarily dismissed. Nevertheless, the suit
within a suit requirement, when applied in an action of litigation
malpractice, effectively extends this burden of proof by requiring the
plaintiff to prove the merits of two actions in a single proceeding. Despite
18See, e.g., Lawson v. Sigfrid, 83 Colo. 116, 262 P. 1018 (1927); Jones v. Wright, 19 Ga.
App. 242, 91 S.E. 265 (1917). The damage issue in legal malpractice is not significantly
different from that in ordinary negligence actions unless the damages are unliquidated, in
which case the argument has been made that the jury in the malpractice action should not be
allowed to "speculate" on the amount of damages which might have been awarded by the
original jury. See Attorney Negligence, supra note 15 at 234-35. An additional aspect of the
damage issue in legal malpractice is that evidence as to the original opposing party's
insurance coverage is admissible to prove his ability or disability to respond in damages. See
id. at 237-38. For more information on the damage issue in legal malpractice, see generally
Annot., 45 A.L.R.2d 62 (1956). It should be noted in this connection that the causation issue
is often treated as one of damages, the suit within a suit rule being then considered as a
method of ascertaining the plaintiff's damages. See Attorney Negligence, supra note 15 at 235.
19Leavitt, The Attorney as Defendant, 13 HASTINGs L.J. 1, 30 (1961).20See, e.g., Shayne & Dachs, Legal Malpractice-The Rising Cost of the Error of Our
Ways, 25 DEF. L.J. 425, 435 (1976).2
'Annot., 45 A.L.R.2d 5, 10-11 (1956).22Thus, the requirement that the plaintiff in a negligenceiaction must show that the
defendant at least "had something to do with" the damage alleged. See generally Malone,
Rumindtions on Cause-In-Fact, 9 STAN. L. REV. 60 (1956).
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the fact that the litigation malpractice plaintiff is able to demonstrate that
his attorney was negligent, he may be unable to satisfy the suit within a
suit requirement. The net effect, then, is to deny relief to a litigation
malpractice plaintiff regardless of his ability to show a causal connection
between the defendant's negligence and the loss of his cause of action. The
suit within a suit requirement thus does little to support the policy behind
causation but often has the effect of exonerating negligent attorneys.
The second conceptual problem underlying the imposition of the suit
within a suit requirement in a litigation malpractice action is that the rule
fails to distinguish between the burdens placed on the plaintiff to prove
causation and to prove damages.2 3 An example of the indiscriminate
operation of the suit within a suit rule in the context of damages is
instructive. If the plaintiff in the legal malpractice action was also the
plaintiff in the underlying tort action, say a personal injury action with
valid claims for unliquidated and punitive damages, and his attorney failed
to file within the statute of limitations, the plaintiff-client will be required
to prove not only that he would have won on the merits but also the
damages that would have been recovered in the underlying action and the
ability of the original defendant to respond in damages. On the other
hand, if the plaintiff in the malpractice action was the defendant in the
underlying action and his attorney failed to file a timely answer, the result
being default judgment, the plaintiff-client, although he will still have to
prove causation (in this case a valid defense), will not be required to prove
damages. The extent of his harm is liquidated in the amount of the
judgment. Concededly, the distinction between cause in fact and damages
is blurred in the context of litigation malpractice regardless of the suit
within a suit requirement because the proof of causation involves the proof
of damages. Thus, if the attorney loses a worthless cause of action, fails to
assert an invalid defense or does not file an action against an insolvent
defendant within the statute of limitations, it cannot be said that "but for"
the negligence of the attorney the plaintiff would not have suffered a loss.
Nevertheless, the suit within a suit requirement in effect merges the two
issues with the result that the plaintiff will often be required to prove
damages in order to prove causation. Since the litigation malpractice
plaintiff must also prove causation in order to prove damages, the suit
within a suit requirement produces a bootstrapping effect which denies
recovery to clients who have lost valid underlying actions as well as to
those who had no valid action at the outset.
The suit within a suit requirement is based on early American cases in
which the real issue was damages. Most of these cases are either unrelated
to legal malpractice 24 or are exclusively limited to those legal malpractice
23See note 16 supra.24See, e.g., Governor v. Baker, 14 Ala. 652 (1848); Bank of Mobile v. Huggins, 3 Ala. 206
(1841); Getchell & Martin L.M. Co. v. Employers Liab. Assurance Corp., 117 Iowa 180, 90
[Vol. 52:689
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cases in which the alleged negligence involved a breach of the attorney's
duty to collect on a promissory note or similar instrument.25 The early
American cases are traceable to English cases in which the issue was also
damages; 26 those cases which are on point often do not cite authority
supporting their ruling that the plaintiff must bear the burden of proof for
all of the elements of both cases, 27 but apparently the rationale is that "suits
against attorneys for negligence are governed by the same principles as
apply in other negligent [sic] actions." 28 The courts seem to accept this
rationale without discussion, 29 as there are no cases which recognize a
distinction between the proof of cause in fact in legal malpractice actions
and ordinary negligence actions. The suit within a suit requirement thus
finds no sound basis in the case law unless one blindly concurs with the
proposition that the doctrine of causation should be mechanically applied
in legal malpractice. Given that the suit within a suit rule is extremely
harsh, adds little or nothing to the policy underlying the requirement that
the plaintiff assume the burden of proof on causation, and is unfounded in
case law, an alternative method of treating the causation issue is both
desirable and necessary.
Failure to Discover Applicable Law: The Subjectification of the
Standard of Care
If the attorney acts for or renders advice to his client based on
insufficient research, for example by drafting an instrument which violates
a statutory requirement ° or by rendering advice which is contrary to the
N.W. 616 (1902); Staples v. Staples, 85 Va. 76, 7 S.E. 199 (Sup. Ct. App. 1888); Seefeld v.
Chicago Minnesota & St. Paul Ry. Co., 70 Wis. 216, 35 N.W. 278 (1887).
2Goodman & Mitchell v. Walker, 30 Ala. 482 (1857); Walker v. Goodman, 21 Ala. 647
(1852); Pennington v. Yell, 11 Ark. 212 (1850).26See, e.g., Russell v. Palmer, 95 Eng. Rep. 837, 2 Wils. 325 (K.B. 1767), in which the
defendant-attorney's negligence in failing to collect a judgment entered against one Stewart in
favor of his client allegedly resulted in damages of £ 3500. In the first malpractice trial, the
presiding judge directed the jury that they might enter a verdict for the whole debt due, and
the plaintiff received a verdict of £ 3000. In the second trial, the jury was allowed to "find
what damages they pleased, and accordingly found only £ 500, as it appeared to them in
evidence, that Stewart was not totally insolvent." Id. at 839, 2 Wils. at 328.
27See, e.g, Nave v. Baird, 12 Ind. 318 (1859), in which the court ruled that the attorney's
refusal to apply for a change of venue would not subject him to liability unless the plaintiff
could prove that the application for the change of venue would have been accepted and that
he was damaged by the refusal. No authority was cited in support of the ruling.
28Maryland Cas. Co. v. Price, 231 F. 397, 402 (4th Cir. 1916). The court did recognize,
however, that there was some conflict on this point in the reported decisions.29See, e.g., Brown v. Gitlin, 19 Ill. App. 3d 1018, 313 N.E.2d 180 (1974). In affirming
entry of judgment against plaintiff by the Cook County Circuit Court, the appellate court indi-
cated that, although the attorneys failed to file a stock transfer report as required by the Illinois
Securities Act, testimony of the defendant's three expert witnesses over the testimony of
plaintiff's single expert was sufficient to sustain a directed verdict for the defendant. The court
seemed predisposed on the issue, stating that, "[i]n a case such as this, error by the attorney
does not constitute malpractice." Id. at 1021, 313 N.E.2d at 183.
SOSee, e.g., Brown v. Gitlin, 19 Ill. App. 3d 1018, 313 N.E.2d 180 (1974).
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legal opinion expressed in the published case law, the issue is whether his
failure to discover and correctly apply the law constitutes negligence. It is
in this category of cases that courts often subjectify the standard of care, 1
and it is not uncommon that the jury is instructed that if the defendant
acted in good faith or with a "fair degree" of knowledge and skill, he
should not be considered negligent.12
The historical development of the standard of care reveals the protec-
tive attitude with which the courts have traditionally approached members
of the legal profession accused of negligence. Early cases in this country
and in England held an attorney liable only for "gross negligence,"33
although it is possible that this phrase meant only a failure to exercise
ordinary care because it developed when terminology in the negligence
field was still in its formative stages. 4 The United States Supreme Court,
in Savings Bank v. Ward,'5 set forth the general standard of care which
forms the basis of the present rule regarding attorney malpractice:
Proof of employment and the want of reasonable care and skill are
prerequisites to the maintenance of the action; but it must not be
understood that an attorney is liable for every mistake that may occur in
practice, or that he may be held responsbile to his client for every error of
judgment in the conduct of his client's cause. Instead of that, the rule is
that if he acts with a proper degree of skill, and with reasonable care and
to the best of his knowledge, he will not be held responsible.3 6
"
1The general rule "requires an attorney to exercise the knowledge, skill, and ability
ordinarily possessed and exercised by members of the legal profession similarly situated." 7
AM. JUR. 2d Attorneys at Law § 168 (1963).32The court habitually subjectifies the standard of care by instructing the jury to find for
the defendant on the issue of negligence if he acted in good faith or with a "fair degree" of
knowledge and skill. See, e.g., Savings Bank v. Ward, 100 U.S. 195 (1879); Palmer v. Nissen,
256 F. Supp. 497 (D. Me. 1966); Babbitt v. Bumpus, 73 Mich. 331, 41 N.W. 417 (1889). For an
extreme example of a subjective standard of care, see Lynn v. Lynn, 4 Wash. App. 171, 480
P.2d 789 (1971), where the court described the standard as follows:
Attorneys frequently differ on trial tactics, and obviously the substitute attorney did
not agree with the trial attorney on the manner in which the trial was conducted. A
difference of opinion on trial tactics, however, does not constitute either negligence
or incompetence. The test of the skill and competence of counsel is: After
considering the entire record, was the complaining party afforded a fair trial?
Id. at 175, 480 P.2d 792. Courts have also held that the standard of care may vary depending
upon such factors as the amount of time in which the attorney had to make his decision
regarding the alleged negligent conduct; this injects further subjective elements into the
standard of care. See Gillen, Legal Malpractice, 12 WASHBURN L.J. 281 (1973).
33See, e.g., Pennington v. Yell, 11 Ark. 212 (1850); Fitch v. Scott, 4 Miss. (3 Howard) 314
(1839); Baikie v. Chandness, 170 Eng. Rep. 1291, 3 Camp. 17 (N. P. 1811).
Some courts used the phrases lata culpa and crassa neglegentia, but apparently meant
only ordinary negligence. See Wade, The Attorney's Liability for Negligence, 12 VAND. L.
REv. 755, 760 (1959).
3 40ne of the best explanations of the terminology is found in Holmes v. Peck, I R.I. 242
(1849): "We recognize the principle, which subjects an attorney for the want of ordinary skill
and care in the management of the business entrusted to him, as anyone else, who professes
any other art or mystery. The want of ordinary care and skill in such a person is gross
negligence." Id. at 245.
35100 U.S. 195 (1879).
361d. at 198.
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Although this standard virtually eliminated the overprotective "gross
negligence" standard in American legal malpractice jurisprudence, never-
theless "[t]he holding of Savings Bank represented a judicial attitude which
resulted in the legal profession adhering to laissez-faire oriented standards
of professional responsibility strikingly inconsistent with the standards of
liability developing in other areas of the law." 37 This judicial attitude is
reflected by the subjective aspect of the Savings Bank standard which
provides that the attorney is not held responsible as long as he conducts the
client's cause "to the best of his knowledge."
As has often been noted, the standard of care has not become more clear
with the passage of time.3 8 An examination of the standards of care used
since Savings Bank reveals that the courts exercise a broad range of
discretion in describing the attorney's duty to his client.3 9 Subjectifying.any
portion of the standard of care is inappropriate in legal malpractice
because when the attorney accepts employment, he theoretically undertakes
to perform his client's business with the care, skill and knowledge which
fellow members of the bar exercise. Further, since the average client is
totally ignorant of the intricacies of law, he should be able to rely on
professional advice, and the standard of care used in legal malpractice
should advance that reliance. Finally, the client's only means of protection
against improperly rendered legal services is an action in malpractice, and
subjectification of the standard of care effectively strips him of this
protection. When the attorney has lost his client's action by virtue of his
failure to discover the applicable law, the subjectification of the standard of
care amounts to nothing less than a judicial determination that for
attorneys ignorance of the law is an excuse.4 0
Error Based on Informed Professional Judgment: Good Faith as an Excuse
It happens occasionally that the attorney, after having researched the
law applicable to his client's problem, discovers that the problem lies in
one of the many "grey areas" of the law. Perhaps the case law is in
S7Note, Legal Malpractice-Erosion of the Traditional Suit Within a Suit Requirement,
7 Toi. L. REv. 328, 331 (1975).3 8See, e.g., Heffernan, Professional Malpractice Insurance: Let the Attorney Beware, 48
CONN. B.J. 347, 348 (1975).
39Thus, in Spangler v. Sellers, 5 F. 882 (C.C.D. Ohio 1881), the court included in its
instructions to the jury concerning the standard of care the statement that the attorney's duty
to his client "did not require of him the possession of perfect legal knowledge, and the highest
degree of skill in relation to business of that character, nor that he would conduct it with the
greatest degree of diligence, care, and prudence." Id. at 887. In the more recent case of
Hodges v. Carter, 239 N.C. 517, 80 S.E.2d 144 (1954), the court included in its statement to the
jury the instruction that the attorney, in undertaking his employment, represents that "he will
exert his best judgment in the prosecution of the litigation entrusted to him; and ... he will
exercise reasonable and ordinary care and diligence in the use of his skill and in the
application of his knowledge to his client's cause." Id. at 519, 80 S.E.2d at 145-46.
40 This inconsistency has never been explanied by the courts. See Wade, The Attorney's
Liability for Negligence, 12 VAND. L. REV. 755, 755 (1959).
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conflict, or the applicable statute is ambiguous and has not been construed
by the courts. In such cases the attorney's opinion may represent little
more than an educated guess, and if he guesses incorrectly, the resulting
malpractice action fits within the third category. In this area of good faith
error the plaintiff-client's case is the weakest because the deterrence policy,
which supports the extension of legal malpractice liability, does not apply.
As might be expected, within this category "the courts will almost always
exonerate the attorney from malpractice liability .. .."' Two methods are
used.
If the court feels that the attorney exercised his best judgment on a
questionable area of law, the instructions given the jury go beyond
subjectification of the standard of care; the jury is literally ordered to find
for the defendant if he has shown that he exercised his' professional
judgment in good faith.4 2 The rationale for excusing the attorney under
such circumstances has been expressed by the courts many times: the
professional must be given a certain degree of "diagnostic leeway" without
fear of liability or he will refuse to exercise his professional judgment in
the future.43 Although it is not clear that good faith should be a defense in
any negligence action,
[t]he attorney does enjoy a favored position in the law of malpractice,
particularly in this important area of the exercise of professional judgment
in situations in which there is no absolute answer to a problem ...
[W]hen it comes down to the nitty-gritty of a particular case, the lawyer
appears to escape liability unless it can be shown that his action, whatever
it was, was clearly and demonstrably wrong . . .44
This state of the law seems particularly objectionable because the layman
has no alternative source of advice and "he expects and should expect
competent professional advice and guidance even on the toughest issues,
where he needs it most."4 5
A second method used to limit the plaintiff's recovery is to make the
negligence issue a question of law. 46  The leading case supporting this
4'Lawyers' Malpractice, supra note 5, at 897.
42See, e.g., Smith v. St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co., 366 F. Supp. 1238 (M.D. La. 1973).
See also Wade, The Attorney's Liability for Negligence, 12 VAND. L. REv. 755, 760 (1959).
In Lucas v. Hamm, 56 Cal. 2d 583, 364 P.2d 685, 15 Cal. Reptr. 821, cert. denied, 368
U.S. 987 (1961), the court was of the opinion that "[t]he attorney is not liable for every mistake
he may make in his practice... he is not liable for being in error as to a question of law on
which reasonable doubt may be entertained by well-informed lawyers." Id. at 591, 364 P.2d at
689, 15 Cal. Reptr. at 825.
43See, e.g., Dorf v. Relies, 355 F.2d 488 (7th Cir. 1966) ("If a judgment against an
attorney, on a record such as is before us, can be justified, the legal profession would be more
hazardous than the law contemplates"); Breedlove v. Turner, 9 Mart. 353 (La. Sup. Ct. 1821)
("No one, therefore, would dare to pursue the profession, if he was held responsible for the
consequences of a causal failure of his memory, or a mistaken course of reasoning.").
44Lawyers' Malpractice, supra note 5, at 903.
45d. at 899.
"6See, e.g., Lucas v. Hamm, 56 Cal. 2d 583, 364 P.2d 685, 15 Cal. Rptr. 821, cert. denied,
368 U.S. 987 (1961); Gambert v. Hart, 44 Cal. 542 (1872); Armstrong v. Adams, 102 Cal. App.
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approach is Gambert v. Hart,4 7 a California case decided in 1872. The
court, without citing supporting authority or justifying its conclusion,
ruled: "In actions of this character against attorneys, the rule is well settled
that when the facts are ascertained the question of negligence or want of
skill is a question of law for the Court." 48 Another leading case which
adopted the same holding is Gimbel v. Waldeman,49 which stated:
[N]o question of fact is involved but.., the matter is one of pure law and
... it would be improper to submit to a jury of lay persons the question
whether the advice was correct, or, if incorrect, whether in view of the state
of the law on the subject the defendant was guilty of negligence.50
The court implied that the rationale for taking the negligence issue from
the jury within this category of cases is that the issue is inherently legal-
too complicated for the lay juror to comprehend and decide. Unlike the
Gambert court, the New York Supreme Court in Gimbel cited authority to
support its decision to remove the issue from the jury.5' Neither of the
supporting cases, however, involved legal malpractice; both cases merely
stand for the proposition that questions of foreign law which depend on
the construction of statutes or judicial opinions of the foreign jurisdiction
are questions of law for the court. The Gimbel court's reliance on these
cases strengthens the inference that the rationale for removing the question
of the attorney's negligence from the jury was based solely on the
complexity of the legal issues.5 2 Although the question of law approach
has been seriously undermined by the recent case law,53 apparently the
negligence issue might still be decided by the court if the attorney acted on
a so-called "esoteric problem'? of law.
54
677, 283 P. 871 (1929); Casner v. Gray, 54 Colo. 551, 131 P. 404 (1913); Gimbel v. Waldeman,
193 Misc. 758, 84 N.Y.S.2d 888 (Sup. Ct. 1948); Hill v. Mynatt, 59 S.W. 163 (Tenn. Ct. Ch.
App. 1900). These cases represent a minority view that the negligence issue is a question of
law for the court in a legal malpractice action. This is to be distinguished from the situation
where the evidence is so overwhelmingly in favor of the defendant-attorney that a directed
verdict in his favor is warranted. It is often difficult to determine which approach is being
used by the court. See Note, Standard of Care in Legal malpractice, 43 IND. L.J. 771, 776 n.27
(1967).
4744 Cal. 542 (1872).
'OId. at 552.
49193 Misc. 758, 84 N.Y.S.2d 888 (Sup. Ct. 1948).
50ld. at 760, 84 N.Y.S.2d at 891 (emphasis added).
5 1Hanna v. Lichtenhein, 225 N.Y. 579, 122 N.E. 625 (1919); Bank of China, Japan ge The
Straits, Ltd. v. Morse, 168 N.Y. 458, 61 N.E. 774 (1901).
S2Hill v. Mynatt, 59 S.W. 163 (Tenn. Ct. Ch. App. 1900), was also an action against an
attorney in which the alleged negligence involved a debatable point of law. The court did not
directly speak on the question of whether the issue was one for the jury or the court, but did in
fact decide it as a matter of law, also applying the stated rationale by implication.
53Gambert was recognized but not followed in California until 1966, when it was
overruled in Ishmael v. Millington, 241 Cal. App. 2d 520, 50 Cal. Rptr. 592 (1966). The recent
cases have all reiterated the overthrow of the question of law approach to the negligence issue
in legal malpractice. See, e.g., Frank H. Taylor & Son, Inc. v. Sheppard, 136 N.J. Super. 85,
344 A.2d 344 (1975); Grago v. Robertson, 49 App. Div. 2d 645, 370 N.Y.S.2d 255 (1975).
54See Lucas v. Hamm, 56 Cal. 2d 583, 364 P.2d 685, 15 Cal. Rptr. 821, cert. denied, 368
U.S. 987 (1961); Wright v. Williams, 47 Cal. App. 3d 802, 121 Cal. Rptr. 722 (Ct. Spec. App.
1975).
1977]
INDIANA LAW JOURNAL
The practice of deciding negligence as a matter of law, peculiar to the
field of legal malpractice, has been justified on the ground that since the
judge is uniquely qualified in legal matters, the submission of the
negligence issue to the jury would be superfluous.55 However, since the
jury resolves complicated issues of fact in other types of civil actions, there
seems to be no compelling reason to treat the issue differently in legal
malpractice. 56 Furthermore, since the courts which have used the question
of law approach unanimously find in favor of the defendant-attorney, the
removal of the negligence issue from the jury appears to be a subterfuge for
limiting recovery in legal malpractice. The fact that in a majority of legal
malpractice actions which reach litigation the defendant-attorney waives
the right to jury trial also raises the inference that the court is considered a
more sympathetic trier of fact from the attorney's standpoint.57 In reality,
the courts have failed to recognize that a mixed question of law and fact is
involved.
Despite the fact that professionals must be accorded a degree of freedom
in the exercise of their professional judgment, it does not follow that the
attorney who errs on a debatable point of law should be unequivocally
relieved of liability. Good faith has never been considered a defense in a
negligence action, and the issue is decided by the jury in every other branch
of tort law. Within the field of medical malpractice, the physician is often
held liable despite the fact that he exercised his informed professional
judgment in good faith. 58 At the first level is the determination that, as a
matter of law, certain conduct does or does not constitute negligence. Then
follows the determination whether the conduct in the case at hand does in
fact meet the standard of care required. It is at this second level of analysis
that courts have arrogated a jury function to themselves.
55Note, Standard of Care in Legal Malpractice, 43 IND. L.J. 771, 777 (1967).56More important, it is quite possible that judges, when not required to state the
standard by which they measure attorney negligence, may begin to decide the issue according
to their personal predispositions:
Allocating responsibility between judge and jury in attorney malpractice suits raises
questions even more delicate and complex than those presented in ordinary
negligence cases, which normally involve mixed questions of law and fact. The
nature of the relationship between bench and bar inevitably influences judicial
attitudes. It is not entirely unrealistic to suppose that some judges who feel strongly
about improving the legal profession may treat an erring attorney with excessive
harshness. Moreover, since judges are constantly exposed to a wide range of legal
issues, they may believe that they are uniquely qualified to evaluate the difficulty of
the probelms that faced the defendant attorney.
Note, Attorney Malpractice, 63 CoLuM. L. REv. 1292, 1306 (1963).57Note, Use of Expert Testimony in Attorney Malpractice Cases, 15 HAsTINGs L.J. 584,
586 (1964).
58Lawyers' Malpractice, supra note 5, at 888-89, suggests that the dichotomy between
recovery in legal as opposed to medical malpractice is explained by the straightforward
rationale that, since an attorney's mistake results in loss of money and property while a
doctor's mistake results in loss of life and health, which occupy a higher position in the
American value system, recovery in legal malpractice is less frequent. See note 78 infra.
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A SOLUTION TO THE PLAINTIFF-CLIENT'S DILEMMA
Modified Res Ipsa Loquitur
Although the requirement that the plaintiff prove cause-in-fact cer-
tainly should not be abandoned in legal malpractice, its application might
easily be modified to ease the unjustifiably harsh burden placed on the
malpractice plaintiff when the alleged negligence involves a litigation
error. Once the plaintiff shows (1) that an attorney-client relationship
existed and (2) that the attorney negligently lost the original action
through a litigation error, the burden of proof should shift to the defendant
to show that the client's action was not meritorious. This shift in the
burden of proof is suggested by the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur, but is a
modified version of that doctrine as applied to an action in litigation
malpractice.5 9 The theory is appealing for several reasons. First, it satisfies
the major policy underlying the cause-in-fact requirement-the dismissal
of frivolous suits against innocent defendants. The plaintiff's suit is not
frivolous when he is required to prove an attorney-client relationship, and
the defendant is hardly innocent if the plaintiff can show loss or
compromise of his action due to the attorney's conduct. These require-
ments, which would be placed on the plaintiff as conditions for invoking
the modified res ipsa loquitur theory, would thus allow valid actions to
reach litigation without significantly increasing the danger of an expan-
sion in frivolous malpractice actions. Second, the burden of proof on the
litigation malpractice plaintiff is reduced to a tolerable level; once the
plaintiff has proved a casual connection between the defendant's conduct
and the loss or compromise of his cause of action or appeal it is not
unreasonable to require the defendant to bear that part of the burden of
proof-that the original action was invalid-which represents an extension
beyond that burden normally required of the plaintiff in a tort action.
Third, shifting the burden of proof on causation to the defendant in
nonmalpractice tort law is not novel, 0 and there is no compelling reason
why the burden should not shift in this limited class of cases, where the
litigation malpractice plaintiff can usually show that the defendant's
negligence had some substantial connection with the loss of his cause of
action, although he can seldom prove "but for" causation. Finally,
acceptance of the client's case raises the presumption that the attorney, at
least at one time, thought that the plaintiff's original action possessed
merit.6'
59See Lawyers' Malpractice, supra note 5.
60See, e.g., Haft v. Lone Palm Hotel, 3 Cal. 3d 756, 478 P.2d 465, 91 Cal. Rptr. 745 (1970);
Summers v. Tice, 33 Cal. 2d 80, 199 P.2d 1 (1948). Although the policy considerations in
simple tort cases differ from those in legal malpractice cases, Halt and Summers are analogous
to the extent that they stand for the proposition that the burden of proof on causation can
shift when it is impossible or extremely difficult for the plaintiff who has been injured by a
negligent defendant to bear the full burden of proof.611n such a case, "it might not be too unreasonable to require the attorney to prove the
lack of merit in the claim he encouraged his client to pursue." Lawyers' Malpractice, supra
note 5, at 893.
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Since the modified res ipsa loquitur theory merely shifts the burden of
producing evidence to the defendant-attorney and does not affect the
burden of persuasion, which always remains on the plaintiff, one criticism
of the theory is that it .will have little dispositive effect "except in the
occasional situation in which the parties both avoid offering proof on the
issue, hoping to prevail on the strict legal issue of who had the burden to
proceed." 6 2  Even if this is so, the proposed shift would prevent many
complaints against attorneys from being dismissed on the ground that they
fail to state a cause of action since the litigation malpractice plaintiff
would no longer be required to plead and prove the validity of the original
cause of action. The burden of pleading this issue is also a psychological
setback, making the party who must so plead enter the action as a loser; the
plaintiff-client seldom has the evidence necessary to sustain the burden,
whereas the attorney, who presumably has researched the original case, is
more likely to have the depositions, documents and other evidence relating
to the validity or invalidity of the original action. The knowledge that the
burden of proof will shift if the plaintiff is able to prove a casual
connection would also have the effect of increasing the number of
settlements in this area. This is an especially desirable result in the
category of litigation malpractice, where, as pointed out above, the
defendant-attorney is usually negligent.
There is ample evidence that before legal malpractice was labeled tort
and decided under that body of law that proposed shift in the burden of
proof was the rule rather than the exception. In the case of Fitch v. Scott,63
the attorney failed to bring suit on a promissory note placed in his hands
for collection by a creditor, and thus surrendered the claim since the debtor
subsequently became insolvent. The court held for the plaintiff creditor in
the malpractice action, placing the burden of proof of showing that the
action lacked merit on the defendant-attorney. 64 This result was also
upheld in Coopwood v. Wallace,65 where the court expressed the opinion
that the attorney "became prima facie liable in an action on the case...
which liability he could only discharge by showing, that a judgment ...
would have been unavailing and useless." 66  One nineteenth century
treatise67 laid down the rule that
when negligence has been proved in consequence of which judgment has
gone against the client, it is not incumbent on the client to show that but
for the negligence he could have succeeded in the action. It is for the
solicitor to defend himself if he can by showing that the client has not
been hurt by his negligence. 68
621d.
634 Miss. (3 Howard) 314 (1939).
61d. at 320.
6525 Miss. 129 (1852).661d. at 131.
6 7 F. WHARTON, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF NEGLIGENCE (1874).68ld., § 752.
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Recent cases have expressed a desire to abrogate the suit within a suit
requirement and have in fact used several methods which create a
presumption in favor of the plaintiff-client similar to that effected by the
modified res ipsa loquitur approach of shifting the burden of proof. In
Walker v. Porter,69 the trial court granted the defendant-attorney a nonsuit
because the plaintiff-client failed to prove which of three defendants in the
underlying personal injury action was responsible. Although the court of
appeals accepted the suit within a suit requirement, it nevertheless
reversed:
[T]he underlying facts surrounding the accident followed by [the plain-
tiff's] conference with [the attorney] proved, in our opinion, a prima facie
case that one or more of the three potential defendants involved was legally
responsible . . . .Appellant [plaintiff] was not required to meet this
additional burden.70
In Baker v. Beal,71 defendant-attorneys sacrificed their client's dram shop
action to a two-year statute of limitations. The trial court in the
malpractice action held for the defendants because the plaintiff failed to
prove whether the defendant tavern in the original action was a licensee,
which was a statutory prerequisite to the imposition of liability in the
underlying action. The appellate court noted that the plaintiff had not
challenged the suit within a suit requirement, but that no decision within
the jurisdiction had directly held that rule to be the law. 72 The court then
held that the plaintiff was "entitled to the same presumption defendants rely
on in another context: everyone is presumed to discharge his duty, whether
legal or moral, until the contrary is made to appear." 73 The Baker court
thus appears to support the creation of a presumption in a litigation
malpractice action that the underlying action was valid on a bare showing
of the existence of the attorney-client relationship.
In Smith v. Lewis7 4 an attorney handling a divorce action failed to
recognize that his client had a community interest in some of her husband's
property and consequently failed to assert a valid claim in the uncontested
divorce action; the jury in the malpractice action awarded $100,000
damages. The Supreme Court of California, sitting en banc, affirmed and
stated in a footnote:
6944 Cal. App. 3d 174, 118 Cal. Rptr. 468 (1974).
701d. at 178, 118 Cal. Rptr. at 470.
71225 N.W.2d 106 (Iowa 1975).
721d. at 106.
73d. at 110. It is interesting to note that this part of the court's language evolved from
the Illinois case of Priest v. Dodsworth, 235 Ill. 613, 85 N.E. 940 (1908), cited in Olson v.
North, 276 Ill. App. 457 (1934), to rule that the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur should not be
applied in legal malpractice actions.
7413 Cal. 3d 349, 530 P.2d 589, 118 Cal. Rptr. 621 (1975).
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Whether defendant's negligene was a cause in fact of plaintiff's damage-
an element of proximate cause-is a factual question for the jury to
resolve. . . . Here the jury was correctly instructed that plaintiff had the
burden of proving, inter alia, that defendant's negligence was a proximate
cause of the damage suffered .... [W]e see no reason on the present record
to disturb the jury's implied finding of proximate cause.7 5
The California Supreme Court therefore seems to feel that in a litigation
malpractice action the plaintiff need not bear the burden of proving that
the claim was in fact valid, a crucial part of the suit within a suit
requirement. That the attorney caused the malpractice plaintiff's harm is
presumed from a jury determination of negligence. Legal writers who have
analyzed Smith have expressed fear of an enormous increase in legal
malpractice liability: "If indeed Smith has abrogated the rigorous 'suit
within a suit' requirement, the bifurcated defense that attorneys have long
employed to avoid successful legal malpractice litigation will have been
eliminated in California." 76  One writer, in fact, suggests that "[t]his
inroad on the 'suit within a suit' requirement could very well transform
what we now know as a negligence action into one approaching absolute
liability."7 7 Although these fears are for the most part unfounded since the
plaintiff in each of the foregoing cases had proved negligence, displeasure
with the suit requirement and haphazard judicial attempts to circumvent it
could well result in patchwork solutions to the legal malpractice causation
problem.
The modified res ipsa loquitur theory raises a rebuttable presumption
that the underlying action was valid. Once the plaintiff has shown a causal
connection between the defendant's negligence and the loss of his action,
the defendant-attorney has the burden of showing that plaintiff's claim was
not meritorious. Unlike the suit within a suit requirement, modified res
ipsa loquitur has a sound basis in history and accords with the policies of
deterrence and shifting of loss; its application would result in more
reasonable settlements for the wronged client and, since the plaintiff must
still prove negligence, it would also increase the quality of legal services
without creating a serious increase in frivolous suits.
The Imposition of a Duty to Perform Reasonable Research
In order to bring legal malpractice in line with other forms of
malpractice, the court should submit the negligence issue to the jury under
an objective, standard of care.78 In a legal malpractice action involving the
7
-
51d. at 361 n.9, 530 P.2d at 597 n.9, 118 Cal. Rptr. at 629 n.9.76Note, Legal Malpractice-Erosion of the Traditional Suit Within a Suit Requirement,
7 TOL. L. REv. 328, 339 (1975).77Shayne & Dachs, Legal Malpractice-The Rising Cost of the Error of Our Ways, 25
DEF. L.J. 425, 437 (1976).78Compare Peterson v. Carter, 182 F. Supp. 393 (W.D. Wis. 1960), where the traditional
medical malpractice standard of care is described:
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attorney's failure to discover or correctly apply the applicable law,
negligence should be determined by such factors as the extent of a statute's
recognized applicability by other attorneys, the number and weight of the
cases which the defendant overlooked and their dates of decision relative to
the time of his alleged negligent conduct. The jury is competent to weigh
the evidence relating to such factors and to determine whether the attorney
exercised the skill and ability ordinarily exercised by legal practitioners,
especially since expert testimony is admissible on this issue.7 9 A suggested
jury instruction which sets forth an objective standard of care could be
worded as follows:
Under our system of jurisprudence, an attorney is considered negligent if
he breaches any duty owed to his client. The attorney's primary duty to
his client requires him to exercise the knowledge, skill and ability
ordinarily possessed and exercised by members of the legal profession. If
you conclude that the evidence in this case indicates that this defendant's
conduct fell below this standard, you are to find for the plaintiff on the
issue of negligence.
This instruction contains no subjective factors thus minimizing the
judicial interference but not the jury's determination of negligence, and
restoring the mixed question of law and fact approach which is used in all
other branches of tort law to resolve the issue of negligence.
In addition to the consistent use of an objective standard of care, an
additional jury instruction which sets forth explicitly the attorney's duty to
perform a reasonable degree of research should also be included so as to
clarify the duty and produce judicial consistency. There is support for this
approach in recent case law. In Smith v. Lewis,80 the court stated:
[A] physician or surgeon called to prescribe and professionally treat a patient is
bound to bring to his aid and relief such care the skill as is ordinarily possessed and
used by physicians and surgeons of the same system or school of practice, in the
vicinity or locality in which the physician resides, having reference to the advanced
state of medical or surgical science at the time.
Id. at 394. This standard, unlike that often given in legal malpractice actions, is totally
objective and therefore does not interfere with the jury function of determining the negligence
issue.
79See generally Annot., 17 A.L.R. 3d 1442 (1968). Unfortunately, there is some support in
the literature, see, e.g., Note, Use of Expert Testimony in Attorney Malpractice Cases, 15
HAstrINs L.J. 584 (1964); Note, Standard of Care in Legal Malpractice, 43 IND. L.J. 771 (1967),
and in the case law, see, e.g., Dorf v. Relies, 355 F.2d 488 (7th Cir. 1966); Olson v. North, 276
Ill. App. 457 (1934), for the principle which requires the plaintiff in a legal malpractice action
to produce expert testimony in order to avoid a direct verdict in favor of the defendant or the
entry of a nonsuit. As one commentator, has pointed out,
[it would be overly optimistic to think that the difficulty in obtaining expert
testimony will be less prevalent among attorneys than it is among physicians. When
the "conspiracy of silence" is coupled with the client's problem in finding a lawyer
who is willing to sue his brethren, it can only be concluded that litigation in this
area will be an inadequate and speculative remedy.
Wallach & Kelley, Attorney Malpractice in California: A Shaky Citadel, 10 SANTA CLARA
LAW. 257, 265-66 (1970).
8013 Cal. 3d 349, 530 P.2d 589, 118 Cal. Rptr. 621 (1975).
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[E]ven with respect to an unsettled area of the law, we believe an attorney
assumes an obligation to his client to undertake reasonable research in an
effort to ascertain relevant legal principles and to make an informed
decision as to a course of conduct based upon an intelligent assessment of
the problem.81
It is not yet known whether the duty imposed by the California Supreme
Court will be generally adopted, but this aspect of Smith has been followed
in other California decisions.8 2 It has been said that Smith has greatly
restricted the "unsettled area of the law" category and that, as a result, the
attorney will no longer be excused from liability "unless he can affir-
matively show that he thoroughly researched all facets of the question
related to that area." 83
A jury instruction suggested for the imposition of the duty to perform
reasonable research is as follows:
The attorney's duty to his client also requires him to perform a reasonable
degree of research in attempting to ascertain the legal principles applicable
to his client's action. If you conclude that the evidence indicates that the
defendant did not make a reasonable effort to ascertain the law applicable
to his client's action, you are to find for the plaintiff on the issue of
negligence.
Under this instruction, the jury will weigh the factors relevant to the
resolution of this issue free of judicial interference. The imposition of this
duty will unquestionably have a deterrent effect on those attorneys who
accept actions which they do not have time to research adequately; the
result could only be higher quality legal services, certainly a desirable end.
The Imposition of a Duty to Inform the Client
In cases where the attorney performs reasonable research and yet makes
a good faith error of professional judgment, the determination of negli-
gence is within the competence of the jury. Here too the mixed question
of law and fact approach to negligence should be restored by the consistent
submission of the negligence issue to jury under an objective standard of
care. Most important, expert testimony is admissible, and the issue whether
action taken or advice rendered by the attorney violates professional
standards of care is factual.
An attorney must be allowed to exercise his informed judgment within
a questionable area of law without fear of liability. Nevertheless, because
81 d. at 359, 530 P.2d at 595, 118 Cal. Rptr. at 627.-82See, e.g., Wright v. Williams, 47 Cal. App. 3d 802, 809, 121 Cal. Rptr. 722, 729 (Ct.
Spec. App. 1975): "The duty encompasses both a knowledge of law and an obligation of
diligent research and informed judgment."83Note, Legal Malpractice-Erosion of the Traditional Suit Within a Suit Requirement,
7 ToL. L. REv. 328, 336-37 (1975).
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in some cases his judgment might not meet the standard of the profession,
a possible compromise would be to impose upon an attorney a duty to
inform the client that the legal point is a fine one and to advise him of the
ramifications of various courses of conduct; the client might then decide to
accept the consequences of his attorney's decision or to obtain a second
opinion. The attorney could easily satisfy this requirement by submitting
to his client an explanation of the legal problem, the consequences of the
various alternative ways of approaching the problem, and his informed
judgment of the proper course of conduct. The client could then either
accept this judgment or order his attorfiey to pursue one of the alternative
courses of conduct; the client's decision would be embodied in a letter or
other written document which he would sign.84 The requirement to
inform the patient has long been imposed on the medical practitioner,85
and there seems to be no logical reason for treating the attorney differently.
Imposing a duty to inform the client in situations where the attorney must
act on an unsettled question of law would have the effect of resolving this
category of actions by means of contributory negligence or of the
assumption of the risk doctrine.8 6
A jury instruction which would adequately explain the attorney's duty
to inform his client could be worded as follows:
An attorney is not required to insure the results of his labor, and he is not
considered liable for every mistake which he makes in the course of his
work. Nevertheless, neither the difficulty of the legal point nor a good
faith effort on the part of the attorney is sufficient to exculpate him from
negligent conduct. In cases where the attorney must act on an area of the
law which is unsettled, he has a duty to give reasonable notice to his client
of the possible consequences of the attorney's action in light of the legal
circumstances so that the client may direct the attorney's action on the
subject or seek a second opinion. Thus, if the defendant claims
nonculpability based on the difficulty of the legal point or its unsettled
character, and yet you conclude that the evidence indicates that he did not
give his client reasonable notice of that fact, you should nevertheless find
for the plaintiff on the issue of negligence.
This instruction informs the jury that the attorney is not to be held liable
under all circumstances, but does not emphasize that point; when com-
bined with an objective standard of care, this instruction would provide the
plaintiff some degree of protection in situations where the attorney
normally prevails on a mere showing of good faith. The notice
84See Shayne & Dachs, Legal Malpractice-The Rising Cost of the Error of Our Ways, 25
DEF. L.J. 425, 428 (1976), where it is suggested that such increased communication with the
client is a painless and effective method of avoiding legal malpractice actions.
81See generally Plante, An Analysis of "Informed Consent", 36 FORDHAM L. Ray. 639
(1968).86For general information and cases respecting the defense of contributory negligence in
a legal malpractice action, see Annot., 45 A.L.R.2d 5, 17-18 (1956).
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requirement is an equitable compromise in this area of legal malpractice,
since the attorney is given an opportunity to obtain his client's approval on
a course of conduct and thereby escape liability. Since the instruction
would be given only in the situation where the attorney asserts that he was
not negligent because of the unsettled state of the law, and since the
instruction would be combined with the jury instruction containing an
objective standard of care, the jury would be able to determine the
negligence issue free of judicial arrogation of the question of fact.
CONCLUSION
Courts seem to have developed unstated yet effective methods of
increasing the recovery burden for the legal malpractice plaintiff; whether
these methods are justifiable depends on whether one emphasizes policy
rather than doctrine in the resolution of negligence actions against
attorneys. The suit within a suit requirement and the subjectification of
the standard of care for instance, rules which favor the defendant-attorney,
are supported by the doctrines of causation and fault respectively, the
former because the plaintiff in a negligence action is required to prove
cause-in-fact, and the latter because the doctrine of fault suggests that a
purely objective standard of care is sometimes harsh on defendants who are
incapable of adhering to it. Nevertheless, legal malpractice is an aberration
in many respects from the nonmalpractice negligence action, and there are
convincing arguments that the present approach to malpractice, which
favors attorneys, should be modified to further policies such as deterrence
and shifting of the loss. Artificially limiting recovery in legal malpractice
not only discourages valid suits against attorneys, thereby giving them
unjustifiable differential treatment, it also encourages a quality of advocacy
not consistent with the profession's standards. The policy of deterring
negligent professional conduct supports the premise that legal malpractice
liability should be extended. Moreover, since more attorneys are insured at
present than ever before, 87 the policy of shifting the loss for negligent
conduct to the party best able to insure against it also cuts in favor of an
increase in legal malpractice liability.
Although various alternative methods have been suggested for the
proper handling of legal malpractice claims, 8  it seems clear that the most
feasible solution would involve the modification of the present strict
doctrinal approach within the existing framework of the law of legal
87See note 8 supra.
88See, e.g., Wallach 8c Kelley, Attorney Malpractice in California: A Shaky Citadel, 10
SANTA CLARA LAW. 257, 269-72 (1970), suggesting an elaborate and expensive system based on
the implementation of an impartial review panel for legal malpractice claims. This system is
obviously premised on the impartiality of a panel of attorneys, and would seem to raise the
same objections as were raised in considering whether the issue of negligence is a question of
law for the court. There is as yet no empirical data on the effectiveness of similar systems now
is use for the review of medical malpractice claims.
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malpractice. These modifications would include the adoption of the
modified res ipsa loquitur theory and the consistent submission of the
negligence issue to the jury under an objective standard of care. In
addition, the jury should be explicitly advised as to the duties owed by the
attorney to his client, including the duty to properly research his client's
action and the duty to inform the client in the case where the attorney must
act on an unsettled area of law. The proposed modifications in the
approach to legal malpractice will result in more equitable results which
are consistent with the stated policy goals. If the profession is to improve
its overall image and provide increasingly competent legal service to the
general public, the negligent attorney must be held accountable for his
failure to meet the standards of the legal community.
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